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What is a Fair Amount of Executive Compensation?  
Outrage Potential of Two Key Stakeholder Groups 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The public discussion of executive compensation often centers on “fair” and 
“unfair” amounts and the public outrage over compensation that is deemed too 
high. The academic literature states that such outrage can lead to outrage costs, 
pressuring firms to adjust the level of compensation. However, it is unclear what a 
“fair” compensation is for various stakeholders and how their fairness concerns 
relate to outrage constraints. Based on surveys among two key stakeholder groups 
(representative eligible voters and investment professionals), we provide evidence 
that fairness is an important criterion for both groups but that opinions on how 
large a fair compensation amount should be are widely dispersed. Moreover, 
personality traits systematically influence fairness opinions through self-serving 
interpretations of distributive justice and personal risk attitudes, indicating that a 
“fair” amount of executive compensation may strongly depend on the involved 
stakeholders. Investigating thresholds for outrage, i.e., amounts above which 
compensation is judged “unfairly” high, we show that even though investment 
professionals care for fairness as well, “capital market outrage” might not equate 
to “public outrage”. Our paper contributes to the literature on outrage constraints 
by linking individual fairness concerns to outrage potential and has implications 
for transparency of executive compensation and research on shareholder activism. 
 
Keywords:  Executive compensation, distributive justice, fairness, outrage 
constraints, public outrage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Discussions in the media and politics often claim that the amount of executive compensation 
should be “fair” and that current pay practices are not. Consistent with the increased public 
criticism peaking during the financial crisis (e.g., Page and Jacobs, 2009), the media has 
covered stories of exceptionally high compensation in general and compensation scandals in 
particular (Core et al., 2008). The question of “sufficient” amounts of executive compensation 
has also been raised in research (e.g., Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009). 
Additionally, institutional investors seem concerned about the level of executive 
compensation (Brandes et al., 2008; McCahery and Sautner, 2012). Taken together, this 
evidence points at increased public pressure from stakeholders in general and investors in 
particular to limit the amount of executive compensation. Our study investigates fairness 
concerns about executive compensation of two stakeholder groups—eligible voters and 
investment professionals—and the role of such concerns for “outrage constraints”. 
As illustrated by the following quotes, the perceived fairness of executive compensation 
seems to play a major role in outrage about executive compensation: 
Why bonuses feel so unfair – Greed. Inequality. Envy. There’s no mystery as to why 
bankers have overtaken lawyers in the unpopularity stakes. At the heart of the public’s 
resentment of the bonus culture is the concept of fairness.   —The Telegraph (07 Feb 2012) 
Over the last few years, the perceived divergence between UK economic and corporate 
performance and executive pay levels appeared unjustified and fuelled the public and 
political outcry over so called ‘payments for failure’.   —EY, Into the Light (2014)  
Such public outrage about “unfair” executive compensation is often referred to as an “outrage 
cost” or “outrage constraint” (Bruce et al., 2005; Conyon, 2006). Specifically, the (potential) 
outrage among the public, employees, or shareholders is suggested to limit the amount of 
executive compensation, as it may hurt executives’ reputation or lead to decreased 
shareholder support for executive proposals at the shareholder meeting (Core et al., 2008; 
Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). Some authors even perceive outrage costs as one of the most 
effective means to limit executives’ power over their own compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 
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2004). Likewise, increased public interest in disclosure and the disciplining force of outrage 
also seem to be the impetus for new regulations about increased transparency of executive 
compensation and say-on-pay mechanisms like, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
sections 951 and 953, and UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations of 2002 
(Conyon et al., 2013). Increased transparency may help regulate executive compensation if 
firms anticipate outrage among informed stakeholders for high compensation amounts and 
adjust their executive compensation accordingly (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Conyon, 2014).  
Prior research on the outrage constraint has provided some evidence that the level and 
structure of executive compensation responds to (nonbinding) shareholder votes (e.g., Alissa, 
2015; Ferri and Sandino, 2009) and negative press coverage (Johnson et al., 1997; Kuhnen 
and Niessen, 2012). Thus, potential stakeholder outrage seems to matter to firms. Little is 
known, however, about what constitutes the potential for “public outrage”, how fairness 
preferences of stakeholders could enter into executive compensation and whether fairness 
preferences about executive compensation in the broader “public” opinion differ from “market” 
views on executive compensation. Prior research often used either negative press coverage 
(e.g., Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012) or levels of shareholder voting dissent (e.g., Ferri and 
Maber, 2013) to proxy for outrage ex post. In contrast, this paper is the first to attempt to 
measure outrage potential by investigating opinions on “fair” and “unfair” executive 
compensation of two key stakeholder groups, eligible voters, who represent the public 
perspective, and investment professionals, who represent the market perspective.  
As we will explain in more detail below, the question of what constitutes a fair amount of 
executive compensation closely relates to the concept of distributive justice (Adams, 1965; 
Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985). However, even though most people claim to care about fairness, 
individual definitions of fairness are usually ambiguous and subjective (Cappelen et al., 2005; 
Konow, 2000). This could imply that opinions among stakeholders about “fair” executive 
compensation amounts may be widely dispersed. If this is the case, it may be difficult to find 
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a single fair amount of executive compensation for each firm that most stakeholders would 
agree with. Moreover, based on theory from social psychology, we predict that opinions on 
the fair amount of executive compensation are not unsystematically dispersed but 
systematically biased according to stakeholders’ personality traits. This would additionally 
complicate the determination of a “fair” compensation amount as it would not only depend on 
the firm and its characteristics but also on stakeholders’ and shareholders’ personality traits. 
Specifically, we examine two paths for personality traits to influence perceptions of fair 
compensation amounts. First, individuals could exhibit egocentric fairness biases (Babcock 
and Loewenstein, 1997), i.e., their opinion on fair compensation is motivated by self-serving 
interpretations of fairness and therefore depends on their perceived similarity with executives. 
Second, based on social projection theory (Krueger and Clement, 1997; Ross et al., 1977; 
Taft, 1955), individuals’ own attitudes toward risk-affected variable pay could carry over to 
their preferences for executives’ compensation structure. As we also expect that fairness 
considerations include compensation for the risk associated with a more variable pay 
structure, personality traits could, again, bias opinions on “fair” amounts. 
Because it may be difficult to determine a single “fair” executive compensation amount 
that could be used to avoid outrage costs, and therefore, could be traded off against other costs 
and benefits of executive compensation, we also examine a second way of how fairness 
preferences may enter into executive compensation. Specifically, we also investigate outrage 
thresholds. By outrage threshold, we mean an amount above which executive compensation is 
perceived as ”unfairly” high. While such outrage thresholds are likely to be influenced by 
personality traits as well, they might be less demanding than a strict fairness criterion. That is, 
to avoid outrage, it might be sufficient that a large enough fraction of shareholders and 
stakeholders do not perceive the compensation as “unfairly” high. Thus, outrage costs may 
rather be related to the “unfairness” of executive compensation than to its “fairness“. 
We investigate our research question via two surveys among eligible voters and investment 
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professionals in Germany. The German setting is particularly apt to analyze our question as it 
is characterized by a stakeholder culture, high employee representation, and an active role for 
the government in regulating executive compensation. Thus, executive compensation plays an 
important role for different stakeholder groups. In the first survey, we gather data from 671 
representative eligible voters in the state of Hamburg as part of a bigger survey on political 
opinions and attitudes. Our data comprises opinions on both the fairness of executive 
compensation and the preferred structure of variable and fixed executive pay. We also gather 
data about personality traits of the survey participants. In the second survey, we collect data 
from 140 investment professionals, primarily located in Germany, about their opinions on fair 
executive compensation and preferred executive pay structures. We use these different groups 
for two main reasons: First, as prior research often assumes that investors are mainly 
interested in economic criteria and corporate governance of executive compensation (Core et 
al., 1999; David et al., 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003), we explore whether fairness 
perceptions and corresponding thresholds are relevant to investment professionals. Second, if 
investors exhibit fairness preferences related to executive compensation as well, potential 
differences and similarities between voters proxying “the public” and investment 
professionals proxying “market” opinions, may generate insights into the relation between 
outrage in the media and say-on-pay voting and other shareholder activism. 
The results of our two surveys show that the majority of both groups exhibit fairness 
preferences related to executive compensation but that fairness opinions are widely dispersed in 
both groups. As predicted, opinions are also related to individuals’ personality traits, 
suggesting that the emergence of outrage may depend on the personalities of the involved 
stakeholders. These results indicate that it seems difficult to find a single “fair” amount of 
executive compensation that satisfies all stakeholders. When examining outrage thresholds, 
we find that the actual CEO compensation amounts in all of the 30 largest exchange-listed 
German firms exceed the outrage thresholds of the majority of eligible voters. Yet, only half 
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of these firms exceed the outrage thresholds of the majority of investment professionals. This 
result indicates potential differences in “public” outrage and outrage at the capital market. 
Finally, as transparency about executive compensation is an important prerequisite for outrage 
to become effective, we also analyze how well participants estimated the actual amounts of 
executive compensation. Our results show that most participants largely under- or 
overestimate executives’ actual compensation. Thus, despite recent efforts to improve 
transparency about executive compensation, our surveys among German stakeholders cast 
some doubt about the effectiveness of these efforts in this country.  
Our study makes several contributions to research and practice. First, we contribute to the 
literature on outrage costs by providing evidence that a large majority of both eligible voters 
and investment professionals exhibit fairness preferences related to the amount of executive 
compensation. We also add to prior research on say-on-pay voting dissent (Alissa, 2015; 
Ertimur et al., 2013; Ferri and Maber, 2013) and negative press coverage (Core et al., 2008; 
Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012). While these studies typically capture outrage ex post, we focus on 
outrage potential ex ante by studying executive compensation amounts that our participants 
perceive as “fair” or “unfair”. Thus, we document fairness preferences as an important source 
for the emergence of outrage and identify compensation levels that may lead to outrage.  
Second, our finding that fairness preferences are widely dispersed illustrates that a single 
fair amount of executive compensation that satisfies all stakeholders is unlikely to exist. 
Moreover, the fact that personality traits are associated with opinions on fair executive 
compensation implies that firms may benefit from considering which stakeholder groups may 
be interested in their executive compensation decisions. Firms may even have incentives to 
try to influence the composition of the shareholder base and the board. 
Third, by comparing outrage thresholds of eligible voters and investment professionals we 
contribute to prior research on outrage costs. We find that executive compensation in some 
firms exceeds outrage thresholds of both the majority of voters and investment professionals 
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whereas, for other firms, thresholds are only exceeded for the majority of voters. This result 
may help explain mixed findings on the effectiveness of media coverage as an outrage 
constraint for executive compensation (Core et al., 2008; Hooghiemstra et al., 2015; Kuhnen 
and Niessen, 2012). Specifically, the fact that investors have higher outrage thresholds, rather 
than being indifferent about the fairness of executive compensation, could help explain the 
weak relation between public outrage (as proxied by media coverage) and shareholder voting. 
Finally, by analyzing estimates of actual executive compensation, we can help build a bridge 
between the notion of an outrage constraint and the public interest in disclosure. The observed 
gap between actual and estimated executive pay suggests that recent efforts to improve the 
transparency of executive compensation in Germany may not have succeeded yet. Hence, as 
transparency is needed to transform outrage potential into actual outrage and to become an 
effective constraint, transparency mechanisms may still need to be improved. 
2. BACKGROUND 
(i) The Disclosure of Executive Compensation and the Notion of Fairness 
Early research on executive compensation focused predominantly on the relationship between 
pay and performance (Abowd, 1990; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). While at first this 
relationship was criticized as being too weak (e.g., Baker et al., 1988), concerns about pay 
levels also began to grow in the aftermath of strong increases in compensation during the 
1990s and several compensation scandals that came to light (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; 
Murphy, 1999). Subsequently, executive compensation has remained an ongoing concern in 
Europe and the US (Conyon et al., 2013; Murphy, 2012). 
In an attempt to explain rising compensation levels, the managerial power approach 
suggests that executives shape their own compensation, resulting in rent extraction, inefficient 
incentives, and camouflage compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004, 2005; Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2001). Calls for more transparency as a disciplining instrument have often 
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been made (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2005), and regulators have emphasized corporate 
governance and compensation disclosure in recent years (e.g., SEC, 2006; The Dodd-Frank 
Act, 2010). The proposed benefits of more transparency are based on the belief that the public 
opinion can influence the level and structure of compensation because outrage of different 
stakeholders is costly to managers, directors, and firms in the form of embarrassment, 
reputational harm, and declining shareholder support (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). However, 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of negative press coverage for this so-called outrage 
constraint is mixed. Johnson et al. (1997) find smaller pay increases in firms that have been 
singled out in the press, but Core et al. (2008) find only little evidence that firms lower their 
compensation. Kuhnen and Niessen (2012) find a change in the mix of compensation 
components but not in the overall amount. 
Similar to research on public outrage, prior research on shareholders has also taken 
existing outrage as a starting point for the analysis. For example, Ferri and Maber (2013) 
proxy for outrage ex post with say-on-pay voting behavior. While characterizing 20% dissent 
as high, their data do not allow them to determine whether shareholders who dissent do so due 
to concerns about the fairness of pay levels or due to concerns about other aspects of the 
compensation package like a lack of pay-for-performance. Furthermore, voting dissent does 
not inform what pay levels could trigger dissent ex ante. Similarly, McCahery and Sautner 
(2012) study investors’ concerns about pay levels, but do not distinguish between fairness and 
other motives like concerns about rent extraction. We aim to fill this void by investigating the 
role of fairness concerns as a possible driver of stakeholder outrage from an ex ante 
perspective. This is important for firms and researchers as policies that allow for more 
shareholder influence, like say-on-pay, become more pervasive (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). A 
better understanding of how pay levels affect the potential for outrage from different 
stakeholders may help firms avoid outrage costs. Second, analyzing investors’ fairness 
concerns separately from their governance concerns can inform research on outrage 
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constraints about an understudied motive in executive pay decisions. Finally, analyzing 
outrage potential of different stakeholders may add to understanding the relationship between 
public outrage and shareholder outrage. 
To study stakeholders’ opinions on fair executive compensation amounts, we draw on 
distributive justice theories (Konow, 2003). As in our setting, distributive justice relates to the 
relative positions of two (or more) parties to each other. Under this concept, “fair” executive 
compensation can include amounts that are both quite low or rather high.1 In the following, we 
argue that individual interpretations of distributive justice are associated with systematic 
variation in stakeholders’ opinions on fair executive compensation.2 
Recently, the concept of distributive justice also gained importance in executive 
compensation disclosure. Specifically, as of 2017, Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
requires disclosing median employee pay and its ratio to CEO pay, thereby opening up the 
possibility to relate executive compensation to estimated inputs of employees and executives. 
An experiment by Kelly and Seow (2016) suggests that distributive justice aspects of 
compensation disclosure can negatively affect participants’ judgements of CEO pay fairness 
and perceived workplace climate but simultaneously increase the expected ability to attract 
and retain CEO talent. 
                                                             
1 Distributive justice distinguishes between the equity and the equality principle. According to the equality 
principle, a distribution is fair when all individuals receive the same reward (Konow, 1996). The equity principle 
relates individuals’ fair rewards to their personal inputs (Adams, 1965; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985), so that 
higher rewards are perceived as fair when a person is perceived to provide higher inputs. Therefore, opinions on 
fair executive compensation can differ by how individuals value executive inputs. 
2 To provide evidence that distributive justice preferences may vary among participants, we conducted an 
additional survey among 406 eligible voters among the same population as our main survey. In this survey, we 
find that 90.38% agree with a statement in support of the equity principle: “It is fair that people who contribute 
more also earn more money”. 9.62% support the equality principle: “It is fair that all people earn the same 
amount of money, regardless of their contribution”. This is consistent with O’Brien’s (2011) findings for the UK. 
Additionally, participants, on average, perceive higher inputs of executives than of regular employees. In 
particular, we asked on a seven-point Likert scale whether, relative to regular employees, executives “carry more 
responsibility”, their “actions and decisions have a greater influence on the success of the firm”, they “make 
bigger personal sacrifices (e.g., leisure and family)”, and “are exposed to more stress and personal pressure”. The 
mean values are between 4.42 and 5.27, which is significantly larger than the midpoint of the scale and 
substantially larger than 1, which would reject the idea of larger executive contributions. Both results imply that 
individual interpretations of distributive justice could be diverse and that our survey population may generally 
view executive compensation that exceeds the compensation for average employees to be fair. 
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(ii) Institutional Background in Germany 
The institutional setting in Germany is particularly apt to study fairness concerns as a source 
of outrage costs for mainly three reasons. (1) Germany’s corporate governance system is 
stakeholder-oriented rather than shareholder-oriented. (2) Germany’s two-tier board system is 
characterized by so-called codetermination, i.e., the representation of employees in the 
supervisory board. (3) Government has traditionally been a large shareholder and actively 
regulates executive compensation.  
While Anglo-Saxon countries have mainly adopted a shareholder value perspective (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003; Simnett et al., 2009), Germany has a stakeholder-oriented view (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004). From this view, the corporation is supposed to consider the interests of 
multiple stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, and the government 
(Fauver and Fuerst, 2006; Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997), making potential outrage from multiple 
groups other than shareholders more relevant. In contrast to the one-tier board system in 
Anglo-Saxon countries in which executive board members manage the daily operations and 
non-executive board members supervise the executives, Germany has a two-tier system (du 
Plessis et al., 2012; Weimer and Pape, 1999). In this system, the management board 
(“Vorstand”) develops strategy and runs the daily business, whereas the supervisory board 
(“Aufsichtsrat”) monitors and advises the management board. The latter is also responsible for 
the appointment and removal of management board members and for overseeing their 
compensation (du Plessis et al., 2012; Larcker and Tayan, 2011).  
The second important feature of German corporate governance is the concept of 
codetermination (“Mitbestimmung”). Firms with more than 2,000 employees must allocate 50 
percent of the board seats to employees and 50 percent to shareholders. In firms with 500–
2,000 employees, labor receives one-third of the board seats. Thus, in larger German firms, 
employees can―via the supervisory board―directly influence executive compensation and 
consequently their outrage costs may be particularly relevant. 
 
10 
 
Finally, federal, state and local governments have traditionally been significant 
shareholders. In such a setting, public outrage may directly find its way into executive 
compensation via government representatives on the supervisory board. Moreover, the federal 
government recently also engaged in the regulation of executive compensation. Since 2009, a 
law (VorstAG) requires executive compensation to be “appropriate”. Specifically, 
appropriateness, as defined by the law, requires compensation to be “customary”, i.e., 
comparable to other executives in similar positions and industries, to include a cap for 
“extraordinary” events and, particularly, to be linked to the performance of the executives (du 
Plessis et al., 2012).3 Thus, even though the concepts of fairness and appropriateness may not 
always be accurately separable, appropriateness seems to be mainly linked to pay-for-
performance. In contrast, as we pointed out above, fairness mainly relates to a distributive 
justice perspective and necessarily includes the consideration of multiple persons and their 
relative positions. Therefore, it is broader in scope than the question of an appropriate link of 
compensation to performance. To investigate outrage constraints, we consider the broader 
concept of fairness to be more helpful, as it more comprehensively captures concerns of 
stakeholders about absolute executive compensation amounts. 
3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
(i) Theoretical Foundations 
The consideration of stakeholders’ fairness concerns in executive compensation or, vice versa, 
the analysis of outrage if these concerns are not met would be relatively simple if there was a 
unanimous opinion among stakeholders about the fair amount of executive compensation. 
However, even though many individuals exhibit fairness preferences (Güth et al., 1982; Konow 
1996), individual definitions of fairness are usually subjective and ambiguous (Cappelen et 
al., 2005). Moreover, as we will argue below in more detail, theories from social psychology 
                                                             
3 Additionally, this law introduced the possibility of a non-binding say-on-pay shareholder vote. 
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even imply that stakeholder opinions vary systematically with their personality traits. 
Therefore, we predict that stakeholder opinions on fair executive compensation are 
characterized by substantial variation, and a unanimous fair amount does not exist: 
H1: There is substantial variation in opinions among stakeholders about the amount of 
fair executive compensation. 
If there is no single fair amount that firms can choose to meet all stakeholder preferences, any 
given amount is likely to be too low for some but too high for other stakeholders. However, if 
the dispersion of stakeholder opinions was pure (white) noise, i.e., if none of the variation was 
systematically explained by predictable stakeholder characteristics, a fair amount would still 
exist for each firm based on the average opinion from a random sample of stakeholders. In 
other words, if the dispersion was pure noise, an “objective” fair compensation amount for 
each firm would exist at an aggregated level, independent of a firm’s relevant stakeholders. 
However, in the following, we draw on theories from social psychology to propose that 
opinions on fair compensation vary systematically with stakeholders’ personality traits, 
defined as stable human dispositions regarding their way of thinking, feeling, and acting 
(McCrae and Costa, 1997). As we explain in more detail below, we first propose that 
stakeholders apply self-serving interpretations of distributive fairness when forming opinions 
on fair executive compensation amounts. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 110) state that 
individuals conflate “what is fair with what benefits oneself”. These egocentric interpretations 
typically arise when the interpretation of outcomes is ambiguous (Thompson and Loewenstein, 
1992), like in the case of fair executive compensation for which no clear benchmark exists.  
Second, we propose that personality traits that are associated with individuals’ attitudes 
toward risky outcomes could indirectly bias opinions on fair compensation amounts. 
Specifically, we assume that different levels of compensation risk are implied in individuals’ 
opinions about the amount, so that a higher compensation risk justifies a higher fair amount. 
This is consistent with higher risk premiums for executives when risk increases. Social 
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projection theory (Krueger and Clement, 1997; Ross et al., 1977; Taft, 1955) suggests that 
individuals over-generalize their own traits when making inferences about others and 
disregard others’ actual traits and preferences (Ludwig and Nafziger, 2011; Van Boven and 
Loewenstein, 2003). If stakeholders over-generalize their own risk attitude to executive 
compensation, their own risk attitudes may indirectly increase fair compensation amounts via 
increased preferences for variable compensation.  
Overall, the following predictions imply that even at an aggregated level, opinions on fair 
amounts of executive compensation and outrage potential are not independent of stakeholder 
(or shareholder) composition but contingent on the involved stakeholders’ personality traits. 
(ii) Determinants of Opinions on Fairness of Executive Compensation Amounts 
(a) Perceived Similarity with Executives 
We predict that stakeholders exhibit an egocentric fairness bias when forming an opinion on 
fair executive compensation amounts (Babcock et al., 1995; Messick and Sentis, 1979). 
Specifically, the higher the perceived similarity of stakeholders with executives, the higher 
should be the fair amounts of executive compensation. That means, the more they perceive 
themselves to possess management skills, the closer they feel to the group whose 
compensation they are judging and the higher they perceive a fair compensation to be.  
There can be two nonmutually exclusive reasons for this (Adams, 1965). First, individuals 
feeling more similar to executives may assume higher executive inputs for self-serving reasons 
(Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Second, individuals who feel more similar to executives 
may tend to value a given executive input more highly. Both reasons likely lead to a higher 
perceived value of executive inputs which, according to the equity principle, would increase 
the amounts of executive compensation that are considered fair. We formally state this as H2: 
H2: A higher perceived similarity with executives is positively associated with the 
amounts of executive compensation that are considered fair. 
(b) Preferred Executive Compensation Risk 
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Different opinions on fair executive compensation may also arise because individuals are 
likely influenced by their different preferences for executives’ compensation risk when 
forming opinions on what amount they deem fair. These differences are likely to carry over to 
fair compensation amounts because—under the assumption that executives are risk averse—
individuals are likely willing to grant higher compensation amounts when the share of 
variable compensation increases. The reason is that these higher amounts would serve as the 
executive’s risk premium for carrying more risk. This prediction is consistent with our 
underlying fairness concept as distributive justice theories are based on individuals’ net utility 
and not on expected total amounts (Adams, 1965). 
For our prediction, we suggest that the structure of executive compensation and the 
perception of fair amounts are interrelated so that opinions on fair amounts imply a structure 
that reflects the compensation risk stakeholders would prefer as part of fair executive 
compensation. Thus, our formal hypothesis relates the preferred variable share to 
stakeholders’ opinions on fair compensation amounts: 
H3: A higher preferred variable compensation share is positively associated with the 
amounts of executive compensation that are considered fair.  
(iii) Determinants of the Preferred Executive Compensation Risk4 
As the preference for executives’ compensation risk likely affects the fair amount of executive 
compensation, any personality trait related to the preferred variable compensation share 
would indirectly affect the fair amount. We use social projection theory (Ross et al., 1977) to 
predict that three important personality traits that are associated with individuals’ attitude 
toward risky outcomes (general risk tolerance, optimism, and competitiveness) may influence 
stakeholders’ preferred structure of executive compensation even though the inherent risk 
                                                             
4 In the following, we use preferences for variable compensation as a proxy for stakeholders’ preferred executive 
compensation risk. In particular, we use the variable target compensation share (the ex ante portion of variable 
compensation that would be paid in case of 100% target achievement) and not the actual share to control for 
variation in assumed target achievements. 
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does not affect them personally. 
First, higher variable compensation increases the uncertainty of an executive’s expected 
future income. Higher personal risk tolerance, however, should be associated with a higher 
acceptance of variable compensation. This is consistent with experimental evidence on 
workers’ self-selection into different payment schemes (Chow, 1983; Dohmen and Falk, 
2011). Thus, owing to social projection, the higher a stakeholder’s own risk tolerance, the 
higher should be the preferred variable executive compensation share. 
Second, research in psychology suggests that individuals exhibit varying degrees of 
optimism when predicting future outcomes (e.g., Scheier and Carver, 1985; Weinstein, 1980). 
More optimistic individuals focus more on the positive aspects of risk and, therefore, via 
social projection, should prefer higher variable compensation shares for executives. 
Third, individuals’ preferences for the interpersonal distribution of rewards, i.e., the 
preference for egalitarianism vs. competitiveness, may also be related to the preferred share of 
variable compensation. Specifically, egalitarian individuals should lean more toward 
compensation schemes leading to more equal rewards, whereas competitive individuals should 
lean toward compensation schemes leading to greater inequalities in rewards. This is 
consistent with prior experimental evidence on self-selection into competitive vs. egalitarian 
compensation (Bartling et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). As compensation schemes with 
a larger variable share lead to more unequal rewards, more competitive individuals are likely 
to prefer a larger variable compensation share.  
Finally, we suggest that optimism and competitiveness interact in their effect on the 
preferred variable compensation share. That is, the effect of increased competitiveness on the 
preferred variable share is larger, the more optimistic an individual is. For instance, when 
someone is highly optimistic, higher competitiveness is likely to increase the preferred 
variable pay by a larger extent because the focus on positive outcomes increases the perceived 
benefits of the unequal distribution of rewards. 
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We, therefore, make the following formal predictions: 
H4: Stakeholders’ preferred variable target compensation share in executive 
compensation is… 
a. …positively associated with higher personal risk tolerance, 
b. …positively associated with higher personal optimism, 
c. …positively associated with higher personal competitiveness, and 
d. …more positively associated with personal competitiveness the higher personal 
optimism is. 
(iv) Differences between Eligible Voters and Investment Professionals 
In addition to personality differences that are independent of individuals’ affiliation to a 
stakeholder group, there might be differences in perceptions of fair executive compensation 
amounts between stakeholder groups as well. In particular, as prior research has discussed 
whether professionals’ judgments may be affected by their job experience (Hopkins, 1996; 
Libby et al. 2002), investment professionals’ capital market background and their (possibly) 
higher familiarity with the matter of executive compensation likely affect their perspective on 
executive compensation. However, it is unclear whether this perspective also affects their 
opinions on “fair” amounts as prior research finds similar fairness perceptions of 
professionals and the general public (e.g., Singer 1996). Moreover, investment professionals 
likely belong to a different socio-economic group with higher income and education than the 
average eligible voter. While this aspect might imply higher “fair” compensation amounts 
from investment professionals, it is unclear, overall, how their fairness opinions differ from 
those of eligible voters. Thus, we present our last hypothesis in the null form: 
H5: The amounts of executive compensation that are considered fair by investment 
professionals do not differ from the amounts considered fair by eligible voters. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
(i) Data Collection 
We conducted two surveys to collect data for our two stakeholder groups. First, we surveyed a 
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representative random sample of eligible voters in the state of Hamburg via a computer-
assisted telephone interview. The survey was part of a broader representative study about 
various opinions and attitudes of eligible voters, which is regularly conducted by the social 
science department of a large public university located in Germany. All questions were 
checked for comprehensibility by “GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences”. The 
survey was conducted from mid-May to the end of June 2013.5 The survey population 
consists of all residents of the state of Hamburg over the voting age of 16.6 The random 
sample was selected using the Gabler-Häder-random procedure for representative telephone 
interviews. To include potential nonlisted telephone numbers into the survey, the procedure 
randomizes the last two digits of listed telephone numbers. The average interview time was 30 
minutes. Participation was not incentivized, but the interviewers emphasized that participation 
was important as it offered the opportunity to state personal opinions on current political 
issues. 671 participants completed the standardized questionnaire. Participants were on 
average 51.4 years old, and 55% were female.7 
Second, we conducted an online survey among investment professionals. The survey 
targeted members of a professional association for German investment professionals, 
including a variety of professions in the investment industry like, for example, financial 
analysts and asset managers. Invitation links were sent by e-mail to 1,453 members of the 
association in early November 2013, followed by two reminders. In total, we received 140 
                                                             
5 To ensure that our results from both surveys are not influenced by any recent major media story related to 
executive compensation during the survey period, we conduct a keyword search in the GENIOS press-archive 
database covering 183 major German newspapers with a total circulation of over 26 million copies per issue. We 
use the keywords “manager” and “compensation/remuneration”, “CEO” and “compensation/remuneration,” 
“manager” and “bonus(es)”, ”compensation scandal”, and “manager” and “rip-off” for the time of the survey 
periods as well as two month before each survey. The search yields 4,777 press articles, of which 755 articles 
relate to executive compensation in a specific firm. Three independent raters find that 164 articles have a 
negative tone, 545 have a neutral tone, and 46 have a positive tone. Inter-rater reliability meets accepted 
reliability thresholds with Krippendorff’s alpha equal to 0.71 (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007; Krippendorff, 
2004). The small number of positive and negative articles suggests that survey participants are unlikely to be 
influenced by a particularly positive or negative media story related to executive compensation. 
6 Since 2013, the voting age for state and local elections in Hamburg is 16. All results remain unaffected if we 
exclude survey participants below the age of 18, which is the voting age for national elections in Germany. 
7 While the average age of the population of Hamburg was 42.2 years at that time, the average age of eligible 
voters was considerably higher. 
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surveys until mid-December, resulting in a response rate of 9.6%. The mean age was 44.5 
years, and the mean work experience in the investment industry was 19.2 years with no 
participant having less than four years of work experience.  
(ii) Variable Measurement 
(a) Dependent Variables 
We measure fairness considerations of executive compensation in two ways. First, we measure 
the amount of executive compensation that survey participants consider fair (COMP_FAIR). 
Second, we measure the maximum annual amount of compensation that participants would 
find acceptable (COMP_UNFAIR). We use these variables in our tests of H1–H3. 
To avoid noise in the measurement of our dependent variables that is due to participants’ 
heterogeneous assumptions about firm characteristics such as firm performance, size, or the 
executive’s role, we measure our variables for a representative CEO. Specifically, we asked 
participants to refer to the CEO of an “average” DAX30-firm, i.e., the average of the 30 
largest exchange-listed German firms. For this purpose, we provided participants with the net 
income and number of employees of the “average” DAX30-firm in 2012. Additionally, we 
pointed out that CEO compensation usually consists of a fixed salary and variable bonus 
payments to ensure that participants would state amounts for total compensation. 
Participants were then asked to specify which annual amount of compensation they would 
consider fair for the CEO of such a firm and to state a euro amount per year (COMP_FAIR). 
Additionally, we elicited COMP_UNFAIR by asking: “Irrespective of the CEO’s 
performance, what do you think: Above which total amount would you no longer consider the 
compensation fair?”8 We additionally measure COMP_UNFAIR as prior research indicates 
that small deviations from an amount that individuals consider fair do not make such an 
amount unacceptable but large deviations do (Camerer, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2003). Therefore, 
                                                             
8 As we pointed out above, our underlying fairness concept captures a large variety of opinions on fair 
compensation amounts. Therefore, we did not specify which fairness criteria participants should refer to when 
indicating COMP_FAIR and COMP_UNFAIR. 
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the “maximum acceptable amount” captured by COMP_UNFAIR indicates an individual’s 
upper acceptance threshold and therefore proxies for stakeholders’ outrage threshold.  
To measure participants’ preferred executive compensation risk, we asked participants 
which variable target compensation share (VAR_SHARE) should be included in executive 
compensation. To avoid varying assumptions about firm performance, we told participants to 
assume that the firm had average success and achieved all targets.  
Finally, we also measured participants’ estimate of a CEO reservation wage by asking 
what they estimate to be the minimum annual compensation amount that a particularly 
capable CEO would request to manage the average DAX30-firm (COMP_REQUEST). This 
estimate might reveal governance concerns regarding rent extraction when compared to 
estimates of the actual average compensation of a DAX30-CEO (COMP_ACTUAL).9 The 
latter can also provide insights into public knowledge about compensation practice in general. 
(b) Explanatory Variables 
To test H2 and H4a–H4d, we collect the following personality trait variables from our sample 
of eligible voters. Owing to time restrictions of the investment professionals in our online 
survey, we were not able to collect these variables for this sample and, hence, confine the 
associated hypotheses tests to the sample of eligible voters. 
To measure participants’ perceived similarity with executives (SIMILARITY), we used 
participants’ assessment of their own management skills using the Strength of Personality 
Scale developed by Noelle-Neumann (1985). We argue that the personality strength factors 
are highly descriptive of management skills and, therefore, are a valid proxy for the perceived 
similarity with executives.10 The factors we include are “responsibility” (“I like taking on 
                                                             
9 Shortly before the first survey began, the DSW (Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz e.V.) 
published a study (DSW, 2013) on the amounts of executive compensation paid in DAX30-firms in 2012. The 
average amount that was very close to the one derived from our own analyses of the 2012 annual statements of 
DAX30-firms was prominently communicated in the public media in Germany. 
10 Weiman (1991, 1994) validates the personality strength scale by providing evidence that individuals scoring 
high in personality strength are influential people with central network positions as it is common for managers. 
Since then, the scale has also been widely used to identify opinion leaders (e.g., Scheufele and Shah, 2000; 
Nisbet and Kotcher, 2009; Schenk and Rössler, 1997). 
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responsibility”), “persuasiveness” (“I like convincing others of my opinion”), “role model” (“I 
often notice that others follow my actions”), “authority” (“I can make my point”), and “sense 
of being ahead” (“I am often one step ahead of others”). We asked participants for their 
agreement with these statements on a four-point scale from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 4 (“fully 
agree”). To construct SIMILARITY, we use a formative index across the five items (Bisbe et 
al., 2007; Diamantopoulos and Winkelhofer, 2001).11 
We mainly rely on single-item measures for the remaining personality traits as potential 
respondent fatigue in our telephone survey constrains the interview time to 20 to 30 minutes 
(Lavrakas, 1993). To measure risk tolerance (RISK_TOL), we ask participants to indicate 
how risk tolerant they are on a Likert scale from 0 (“not risk tolerant at all”) to 10 (“very risk 
tolerant”). Sociological panel research has validated such holistic single-item measures as a 
stable personality trait reflecting individuals’ attitude toward risk (Dohmen et al., 2005; The 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study, 2013).  
For the other two attitudes toward risky outcomes, we measure participants’ agreement with 
various statements on a four-point scale from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 4 (“fully agree”). For 
optimism (OPTIMISM), we follow established measures of dispositional optimism by using 
generalized outcome expectancy (Scheier and Carver, 1985): “Usually, I expect that my 
personal affairs will turn out to be successful.” Competitiveness (COMPET) reflects a 
preference for egalitarian vs. competitive outcomes (Bartling et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 
2011). To proxy for competitiveness, we use a formative index of two facets of individuals’ 
self-perception of having relatively superior skills compared to others. First, we measure 
participants’ disposition to take on leadership positions in groups with the following 
                                                             
11 Results from our additional survey, referenced in footnote 2, show that—while controlling for demographic 
variables—similarity with executives is significantly associated with participants’ agreement to the equity 
principle (logistic regression coefficient = 0.37, p < 0.01) and perceived inputs of executives (OLS-regression 
coefficient = 0.22, p < 0.01). Both are important aspects of our underlying fairness concept. Thus, this finding 
supports the view that opinions about fair executive compensation are likely influenced by different 
interpretations of distributive justice.  
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statement: “I like taking the lead in collective activities.” Second, we measure confidence in 
developing better solutions or leading better than others: “I often give advice and make 
recommendations to others.” These two aspects are based on prior research providing evidence 
that competitiveness and leadership are positively related (House and Howell, 1992) and that 
high levels of confidence influence choices to enter competition (Bartling et al., 2009). 
(c) Control Variables for the Eligible Voters Sample 
We employ a series of control variables to account for contextual factors that might affect the 
dependent variables in our models. First, we measure participants’ exposure to business news 
(NEWS). Participants indicate whether they followed the business news within the last three 
months (0 = no, 1 = yes). Second, we measure EDUCATION as participants’ highest 
educational degree at six levels (1 = no degree, 2 = degree after nine years of school, 3 = 
degree after 10 years of school, 4 = high school degree after 12 years, 5 = high school degree 
after 13 years, qualifying for university admission, 6 = college/university degree). Third, 
INCOME is measured by participants’ monthly net household income12 in euros on a 
nonlinear eight-point scale (1 = 0–500, 2 = 501–1,000, 3 = 1,001–1,500, 4 = 1,501–2,000, 5 = 
2,001–3,000, 6 = 3,001–4,000, 7 = 4,001–5,000, 8 = 5,000 and more). Finally, GENDER is 
coded as 0 (male) and 1 (female), and AGE measures participants’ age in years. 
(d) Control and Additional Variables for the Investment Professionals Sample 
In addition to AGE, we included two variables that indicate investment professionals’ 
experience. COVERAGE measures their familiarity with executive compensation in the 
reference group of DAX30-firms on a seven-point Likert scale, and EXPERIENCE measures 
job experience in years. We also include participants’ profession and country they work in. 
In addition to our main dependent variables described above, we collect additional data on 
investment professionals’ perceived relevance of different fairness- and economics-based 
                                                             
12 We use household income instead of personal income as the former represents a better proxy for an individual’s 
economic situation and access to economic resources (Bartolini et al., 2013; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007). 
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criteria for the evaluation of executive compensation. Specifically, we asked investment 
professionals to indicate their agreement to the following four statements on a seven-point 
Likert scale from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 7 (“fully agree”). FAIR_A: “It is important to me that 
the absolute total amount of executive compensation is fair.” FAIR_B: “It is important to me 
that the absolute total amount does not exceed a threshold that I consider no longer 
acceptable.” PPS: “It is important to me that executive compensation is closely related to 
changes in the firm value.” RISK_PREM: “It is important to me that a higher executive 
compensation is only granted when the CEO carries more risk in return.” FAIR_A refers to 
the general relevance of fairness as a criterion for executive compensation, whereas FAIR_B 
relates to the maximum acceptable amount. PPS and RISK_PREM relate to two economics-
based criteria. PPS measures the importance of pay-for-performance sensitivity (Core and 
Guay, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990), and RISK_PREM refers to higher executive 
compensation as a risk premium (Feltham and Xie, 1994; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
5. RESULTS 
(i) Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all dependent, explanatory, and control variables for the 
eligible voters sample, and Table 2 provides the same information for investment 
professionals. To limit the effect of outliers in the subsequent analysis, we conduct a 95% 
winsorization for all variables related to compensation amounts in the eligible voters sample 
and a 98% winsorization in the investment professionals sample.13 
-- Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here -- 
Table 1 shows that 465 of 671 eligible voter participants (69%) stated an opinion on the 
                                                             
13 Our hypotheses tests are statistically and inferentially unaffected for various winsorization levels (90%–96% 
for eligible voters and 90%–no winsorization for investment professionals). When using 99% winsorization or 
no winsorization in the eligible voters sample, our hypotheses are also statistically supported when removing 
participants who stated amounts above €50m as „fair“ (three observations) or „unfair“ (ten observations). 
Regarding our null hypothesis, exclusion of these outliers by and large confirms the mixed evidence that we 
present in our main analysis. 
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fair amount of executive compensation (COMP_FAIR) and 73% stated an opinion on the 
maximum acceptable amount (COMP_UNFAIR). The remaining participants decided not to 
answer the question, indicated no exact amount, or mentioned that they could make no 
generalized statement about a fair amount of compensation. As reported in Table 2, 70% of 
the investment professionals provided an opinion on COMP_FAIR, and 78% did so for 
COMP_UNFAIR. Only a very small fraction of those not providing an answer indicated that 
fairness is not a relevant criterion for executive compensation. We consider this as first 
evidence that fairness matters for investment professionals as well. 
Those voters who stated an opinion, on average, find that €1.38m is a fair amount of 
executive compensation (COMP_FAIR). The maximum acceptable amount (COMP_UNFAIR) 
of this stakeholder group is distinctly higher with €4.13m on average. A similar pattern, but 
on a generally higher level, is shown by the opinions of investment professionals with mean 
values of €2.44m (COMP_FAIR) and €7.04m (COMP_UNFAIR). Both measures seem 
widely dispersed. We will analyze this dispersion in more detail in the hypotheses tests. 
Descriptive statistics for the preferred variable compensation share (VAR_SHARE) as 
reported in Table 1 and Table 2 again indicate a large variation within and between the 
stakeholder groups. While eligible voters prefer 21.1% on average, investment professionals 
prefer 41.2%. Thus, they prefer significantly more compensation risk for executives (t = 9.98, p 
< 0.001). To put these preferences into perspective, we gathered data on the structure of 
variable and fixed compensation from the 2012 compensation reports of the DAX30-firms. In 
contrast to stakeholders’ preferred variable compensation share, the actual average variable 
target compensation share was 69% (based on 15 out of 30 firms), and the realized variable 
compensation share of all DAX30-firms was 67%.  
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations between all variables from the eligible voters 
sample. The correlations provide first evidence in favor of our hypotheses. First, 
VAR_SHARE and SIMILARITY are significantly positively correlated with COMP_FAIR 
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and COMP_UNFAIR. Second, RISK_TOL, OPTIMISM, and COMPET are significantly 
positively correlated with VAR_SHARE. Generally, all correlations are not sufficiently high 
to warrant concerns about multicollinearity.   
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
(ii) Hypotheses Tests 
To test H1 predicting substantial variation in opinions among stakeholders about the amount 
of fair executive compensation, we analyze the dispersion of statements of COMP_FAIR 
within each stakeholder group. For eligible voters, the values for the 10th and 90th percentile 
of COMP_FAIR are €100,000 and €3.50m. Similarly, for the investment professionals, these 
values are €500,000 and €5.00m. In both samples, standard deviations are quite high resulting 
in coefficients of variation of 162% (eligible voters) and 86% (investment professionals).  
Similar to COMP_FAIR, we also find substantial variation in both samples regarding our 
second main dependent variable COMP_UNFAIR. In the sample of eligible voters, the values 
for the 10th and 90th percentile are €120,000 and €10.00m. In the investment professionals 
sample, they are €500,000 and €15.00m. The coefficients of variation are 220% and 92%. 
Together, we consider H1 supported and conclude that there is no unanimous opinion on what 
fair executive compensation is. 
To test our remaining hypotheses, except for H3, we have to refer to the sample of eligible 
voters only, for which we were able to gather data on all dependent, explanatory, and control 
variables. We run OLS regressions using alternative models with and without control 
variables. To correct for heteroscedasticity, we calculate robust standard errors in all 
regressions using the Huber-White estimator.14, 15  
Table 4 displays the results of our regressions used to test H2 and H3. As dependent 
                                                             
14 P-values reported are one-tailed for directional hypotheses tests and two-tailed otherwise. 
15 Since COMP_FAIR and COMP_UNFAIR are lower bounded, we re-run all regressions that test H2 and H3 
with log-transformed dependent variables as a robustness check. With one exception (using COMP_UNFAIR to 
test H2), the results are robust and our conclusions are not affected by this transformation. 
 
24 
 
variables, we use both COMP_FAIR and COMP_UNFAIR. Models (1) and (3) only include 
SIMILARITY and VAR_SHARE as explanatory variables while Models (2) and (4) include 
additional control variables. All four models included in Table 4 support H2 and H3 
predicting that the fair amount is positively associated with the perceived similarity with 
executives (p < 0.05 in Models (1) to (3) and p = 0.087 in Model (4)) and the preferred 
variable compensation share (p < 0.01 in all cases). The control variables reveal that women 
perceive lower amounts of executive compensation as fair than men and that exposure to 
business news significantly increases the fair amount but not the threshold amount.16 
Education and income do not significantly affect opinions on both amounts. The latter finding 
indicates that envy is unlikely to influence perceptions of fair executive compensation.17 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
We also analyze the magnitudes of the reported effects. First, a one standard deviation 
change in SIMILARITY leads to a change of 18.6% in COMP_FAIR in Model (2) and 17.2% 
in COMP_UNFAIR in Model (4). Similarly, a one standard deviation increase of 
VAR_SHARE increases both dependent measures by 40.7% and 36.2%, respectively. 
Second, moving from the lowest to the highest observed levels of SIMILARITY and 
VAR_SHARE is associated with an absolute increase in COMP_FAIR of €1.54m and €2.72m 
as well as an increase in COMP_UNFAIR of €4.26m and €7.24m. This analysis shows that 
our results not only have statistical but also economic significance. 
                                                             
16 We also reran the regressions reported in Table 4 for two subsamples of participants who were either exposed 
to predominantly positive or negative business news and find that our tests of H2 and H3 are inferentially 
unaffected in both subsamples. Additionally, introducing interaction terms for SIMILARITY with NEWS 
(positive/negative) and VAR_SHARE with NEWS (positive/negative) into the regressions reported in Table 4 
does not show any significant interaction (p > 0.23 in all cases). These results provide further evidence that 
participants’ responses are unlikely to be influenced by exposure to recent good or bad business news.  
17 As an alternative measure for envy, we divided the estimated actual income of a CEO (COMP_ACTUAL) by 
the participants’ annual net household income. We used the midpoint of each household income category as a 
euro amount. The larger this measure, the larger is the estimated executive compensation relative to the own 
income and consequently the more envious participants might be. That means, our proxy should be negatively 
associated with the dependent variable. However, if we substitute INCOME by this measure, we find no 
significantly negative association between this proxy and COMP_FAIR or COMP_UNFAIR, indicating that 
envy is not a major motive in opinions on executive compensation. 
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Data from our sample of investment professionals lend additional support to H3. Table 5 
shows regressions with and without control variables for COMP_FAIR and COMP_UNFAIR 
in this sample. Like for the eligible voters, VAR_SHARE has a significantly positive 
association with the stated compensation amount in all models (p ≤ 0.022 in all cases). 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
Table 6 reports the results of our tests of H4a–H4d. Model (1) includes the explanatory 
variables but excludes the interaction between OPTIMISM and COMPET predicted in H4d. It 
provides support for the positive association of personal risk tolerance with VAR_SHARE 
(H4a, p = 0.011), the positive association of optimism (H4b, p = 0.097), and the positive 
association of competitiveness (H4c, p = 0.044).  
-- Insert Table 6 about here -- 
Model (2) adds the interaction between OPTIMISM and COMPET to test H4d and shows 
mean-centered interaction variables to report their partial effects. The interaction effect is 
positive and significant (p = 0.007), supporting H4d. Model (3) additionally includes 
demographic variables and further supports our hypotheses. It also reveals that EDUCATION 
is significantly positively associated with VAR_SHARE (p = 0.014) and that women prefer 
lower variable compensation shares than men (p = 0.002).18 
In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation change in each of the three 
variables RISK_TOL, OPTIMISM, and COMPET leads to changes in VAR_SHARE between 
6.9% and 7.6% from the mean. Moving from the lowest to the highest observed values of 
these variables increases VAR_SHARE, on an absolute basis, between 7 and 8 percentage 
points. Notably, all reported effects are incremental effects of each explanatory variable, 
                                                             
18 We also analyzed whether participants’ political philosophy affects our results. Therefore, we create a dummy 
variable, SOCIALIST, which equals 1 when voters’ long-term affiliation to a political party favored one of the 
leftist parties that are usually characterized as attracting voters with more socialist attitudes (SPD, Linke, Grüne, 
Piratenpartei) and 0 otherwise. Including SOCIALIST into our regressions tabulated in Table 6 does not affect 
any of our inferences regarding H4a-d (not tabulated). Additionally, the coefficient of SOCIALIST is negative 
but not significant in any model (all p’s > 0.10). These results suggest that the effects of risk attitudes are neither 
captured nor confounded by political persuasion. 
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holding constant all other variables in the model. Since our results on H3 indicate that 
preferences for the structure of executive compensation are interrelated with opinions on the 
fair amount, we also investigate the indirect impact of attitudes toward risky outcomes on the 
fair amount. Identifying two sub-groups within the sample of eligible voters indicates a large 
spread in stated amounts. Participants who scored below the median in RISK_TOL, 
OPTIMISM, and COMPET stated a mean COMP_FAIR of €1.06m, while participants 
scoring above the median in all three traits stated €1.87m. The corresponding spread for 
COMP_UNFAIR is €2.87m vs. €6.84m.19 
Taken together, our results indicate that fairness considerations about executive 
compensation not only exhibit a substantial variation but are also systematically biased into 
the direction of each participant’s personality traits. As we will outline below, this can have 
implications for managing the constitution of the shareholder or stakeholder base in a firm. 
Finally, we test H5. As indicated above, the differences in means of COMP_FAIR and 
COMP_UNFAIR between our two samples are substantial (COMP_FAIR: €2.44m vs. 
€1.38m, COMP_UNFAIR: €7.04m vs. €4.13m). These differences are significant 
(COMP_FAIR: t = 4.29, p < 0.001; COMP_UNFAIR: t = 3.31, p = 0.001). However, to make 
the two samples more comparable with regard to the socio-economic background, we restrict 
the sample of eligible voters to participants with a college/university degree and a monthly 
household income of €5,000 or more and no longer find any significant difference with regard 
to COMP_FAIR (€2.44m vs. €2.14m: t = 0.72, p = 0.47) or COMP_UNFAIR (€7.04m vs. 
€6.24m: t = 0.53, p = 0.60). Thus, our evidence regarding H5 is mixed and we cannot 
                                                             
19 As previously shown, the preferred variable compensation share is smaller than the actual variable 
compensation share of our reference firms (21% vs. 69%). To illustrate the potential influence of this gap on 
outrage thresholds, we use the coefficient of VAR_SHARE (€72,419) from Model (4) of Table 4, multiply it by 
the size of the gap 48% (= 69% - 21%), and add it to the mean value of COMP_UNFAIR. The threshold 
increases by €3.5m to €7.6m in total. Similar calculations for the investment professionals indicate an increase 
from €7.0m to €9.6m. Yet, it is unclear whether more salient disclosure of the executive compensation risk could 
help firms lower their outrage costs because a large gap between the preferred and actual variable compensation 
share, i.e., a large deviation from the stated preference, might require firms to convince stakeholders of the need 
for high variable compensation. 
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conclusively reject the null hypothesis. Investment professionals indicate higher fair 
compensation amounts compared to eligible voters as a whole, but differences seem to be 
substantially smaller and insignificant if the latter sample becomes more comparable. This 
result indicates that investment professionals’ capital market background per se does not seem 
to lead to perceptions of fair executive compensation that differ fundamentally from those of 
eligible voters with comparable socio-economic background. 
(iii) Supplementary Analysis 
(a) Fairness as a Criterion for Investment Professionals  
To lend further support to the notion that fairness in executive compensation matters for 
investment professionals, we analyze the additional variables we measured for this sample 
(FAIR_A, FAIR_ B, PPS, RISK_PREM). Descriptive statistics, displayed in Panel A of Table 
2, suggest that all criteria are highly important (all means ≥ 5.35). Pairwise comparisons reveal 
that FAIR_A seems to be more important than FAIR_B (5.75 vs. 5.35, t = 1.74, p = 0.084) but 
show no other significant differences. We also analyze the relative ranks of all criteria implied 
by participants’ importance ratings. We find that the fairness criteria are ranked first (last) by 
57% and 50% (25% and 29%) of the participants, respectively, whereas the economic criteria 
are ranked first (last) by 54% and 49% (23% and 34%) of the participants.20 Pair-wise 
comparisons based on Wilcoxon tests indicate no significant differences (all p > 0.10). 
Moreover, even though the two fairness criteria are significantly correlated (r = 0.42, p < 
0.001) as well as the two economic criteria (r = 0.24, p = 0.004), none of the fairness criteria 
is significantly positively correlated with any of the two economic criteria (p > 0.10 in all 
cases). This suggests that fairness constitutes an independent, but no less important, factor for 
investment professionals in addition to economic criteria. Yet, this does not preclude the 
possibility that other economic criteria may be more important for investment professionals. 
                                                             
20 Due to assigning non-exclusive ranks, the aggregated frequency of a rank can exceed 100%. 
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(b) Outrage Potential from Eligible Voters and Investment Professionals 
As we explained above, the maximum acceptable amount (COMP_UNFAIR) may be more 
relevant for the inclusion of fairness concerns and the measurement of outrage than 
COMP_FAIR. Specifically, it may be that outrage potential exists when a sufficiently high 
number of stakeholders perceive the amount of executive compensation as ”unfairly” high.  
Therefore, we investigate how large such outrage potential would be for the “public 
opinion” (measured by eligible voters) and the “market opinion” (measured by investment 
professionals), for the actual compensation of all DAX30-CEOs in 2012. Specifically, we 
analyze for how many individuals in each sample a firm’s actual CEO compensation exceeds 
the individual’s maximum acceptable amount (COMP_UNFAIR).  
As detailed in Appendix A, we find that for every firm, the outrage threshold of the 
majority of eligible voters is exceeded by the CEO’s compensation amount. In contrast, this is 
only the case for half of the firms when examining the outrage thresholds of the investment 
professionals. This finding relates to the literature on press coverage as a measure of public 
outrage (e.g., Core et al., 2008) and draws a connection to shareholder voting behavior (e.g., 
Ferri and Maber, 2013) and the effectiveness of public outrage as a constraint. Specifically, if 
investment professionals are a better proxy for voting behavior at annual meetings and eligible 
voters are a better proxy for mass media coverage, our results show that press coverage might 
be a noisy indicator of shareholder action against executive compensation. Additionally, any 
disconnect between shareholder voting and press coverage may not indicate that investors do 
not care about fairness but may simply imply that their outrage thresholds are higher. 
(c) Estimations of Actual Executive Compensation 
An important prerequisite or, at least, facilitator for the emergence of outrage about executive 
compensation is transparency about it (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Therefore, we assess 
stakeholders’ knowledge about compensation in practice. We use our participants’ estimated 
compensation of the average DAX30-CEO in 2012 (COMP_ACTUAL). Note that this is the 
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group of executives that dominates almost the entire public discussion about executive 
compensation. Yet, only 10% of eligible voters and 24% of investment professionals estimate 
an actual compensation amount that is within an interval of +/- €1m around the true average 
of €5.19m. As Figure 1 illustrates, many participants under- or overestimate the actual amount 
by far, depicting a rather U-shaped distribution of eligible voters’ estimates. Overall, the 
majority of eligible voters (63%) and investment professionals (83%) underestimate the actual 
amount. Even though investment professionals’ estimates seem more accurate than eligible 
voters’ estimates,21 the accuracy of both groups is still rather low. Furthermore, 35% of 
eligible voters and 8% of investment professionals did not provide any estimate. 
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
Overall, these results suggest that, knowledge of actual compensation is relatively scant, 
despite recent efforts to make disclosure more transparent. Additionally, as accurate 
knowledge about actual executive compensation is a prerequisite for outrage to emerge, our 
results also cast doubt on the current effectiveness of public outrage.22  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates fairness concerns about executive pay levels of two stakeholder 
groups, eligible voters and investment professionals. In our survey, we ask both groups about 
their opinion on a “fair” amount as well as an outrage threshold and study their (potential) 
relation to outrage constraints. Thus, in contrast to prior research that has mainly related pay 
levels to governance concerns of investors (Brandes et al., 2008; McCahery and Sautner, 
2012), our study provides evidence about fairness as an additional criterion and compares a 
broader “public” perspective (eligible voters) with a more “market”-based perspective 
                                                             
21 We calculate the absolute deviation of each participant’s estimate from the actual amount and find this 
deviation to be smaller for investment professionals (€2.47m vs. €7.29m: t = 3.61, p < 0.001). 
22 Further comparison of COMP_ACTUAL and COMP_REQUEST (proxying for participants’ estimate of the 
average CEO’s reservation wage) point at governance concerns of both stakeholder groups related to executive 
rent extraction (a more detailed analysis is available from the authors on request). This result suggests that, in 
addition to fairness concerns, governance concerns can be an independent motive for stakeholder outrage. 
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(investment professionals). Instead of examining the effect of outrage ex post (as, e.g., in Core 
et al., 2008), we study fairness concerns that likely indicate outrage potential as well as 
factors influencing such fairness concerns. 
Our study draws an ambiguous picture about fairness and outrage constraints. First, the 
vast majority of both eligible voters and investment professionals exhibit fairness preferences 
about executive compensation. Thus, our findings imply that recent disclosure regulations on 
pay ratio disclosure (Dodd-Frank Act, Section 953(b)) that are related to stakeholders’ notion 
of fairness seem warranted. Related to prior studies on outrage that analyze stakeholder 
reactions via say-on-pay voting dissent or press coverage (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2013; Kuhnen 
and Niessen, 2012), our approach adds the new perspective of ex-ante outrage potential. 
Second, however, we also find that in both groups fairness opinions are widely dispersed 
such that it seems unrealistic to find a single “fair” amount of executive compensation that 
could satisfy most stakeholders. In fact, most amounts would be too low for some 
stakeholders and too high for others. Moreover, we find that these dispersed opinions on 
fairness are systematically biased by participants’ personality traits. Specifically, in our 
sample of eligible voters, the opinions are influenced by self-serving interpretations of 
fairness and, indirectly, by attitudes toward risky outcomes. This finding implies that even on 
an aggregated level, it may not be possible to obtain a single “fair” amount of executive 
compensation because the personality traits of the involved stakeholders would influence this 
amount. The result also implies incentives for firms to manage the composition of involved 
stakeholder groups as some individuals seem to feel “more like the CEO” and justify higher 
entitlements. For instance, a family consortium and a hedge fund might vote differently not 
only for reasons of alignment of interest but also due to personality. From a research 
perspective, this insight might even explain how executives have used their power to sell their 
compensation as fair to shareholders and board members while the public might have 
disapproved. Additionally, our finding that such self-serving fairness interpretations apply to 
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judgments affecting the wealth of an unrelated person also contributes to the literature on 
distributive justice theories because, previously, people have only been shown to make self-
interested fairness decisions about rewards that affect their own wealth (Konow, 2000). From 
a practical perspective, the same result might even have relevance for employment relations. 
In particular, the influence of potential employee outrage on pay setting might vary between 
firms in different industries and with different organizational structures (e.g., highly 
hierarchical vs. flat organizations) because the perceived similarity with executives may 
depend on the (dis)similarity of job profiles between management and rank and file 
employees that traditionally varies between industries and organizational structures. 
Third, we examine the amounts above which individuals find executive compensation 
unfairly high and use them as a measure for outrage thresholds. Our results reveal that actual 
CEO compensation exceeds the outrage thresholds of the majority of voters for all DAX30-
firms, which serve as a reference group for our surveys, but exceeds the outrage thresholds of 
the majority of investment professionals for only half of the firms. The latter finding implies 
that, owing to perceived unfairness (and not governance concerns), high amounts of executive 
compensation may lead to shareholder activism at shareholder meetings. Additionally, our 
findings may explain why the link between “public outrage” in the mass media and “market 
outrage” at shareholder meetings has been found to be weak (Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). 
Hence, this result may shed further light on the limited impact of negative press coverage on 
executive compensation amounts (e.g., Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012). 
Finally, we investigate participants’ knowledge about actual executive compensation 
amounts and find that this knowledge is relatively scant for both eligible voters and 
investment professionals. It is thus unclear whether, despite recent efforts to improve 
transparency about executive compensation, current transparency mechanisms enable public 
outrage effectively. Therefore, standard setters and policy makers may want to carefully 
reconsider current transparency regulations and ways through which such information can be 
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communicated to improve stakeholders’ knowledge about executive compensation. 
Our study is subject to some limitations and points to opportunities for future research. 
First, as we pointed out above, owing to its stakeholder culture and legal regulations, the 
German setting is particularly apt to analyze our questions. Even though our hypotheses are 
mainly related to the influence of personality traits on opinions on executive compensation 
and they are unlikely to be directionally affected by different views on firms in different 
countries, we simultaneously acknowledge that the German setting may limit the 
generalizability of our findings. Specifically, it would be important to investigate whether, in 
more shareholder oriented countries, the public as well as capital market participants exhibit 
similar concerns about the fairness of executive compensation and how high levels of fair and 
unfairly high compensation would be. Such future research may foster our understanding of 
outrage constraints and how they may be shaped by individual fairness perceptions. 
Second, the design of our study does not allow comparing the importance of fairness as a 
judgment criterion between eligible voters and investment professionals directly and does not 
include all potential economic criteria. Future research could draw a more complete picture of 
the relevance of economic and fairness criteria for different stakeholder groups. 
Despite these limitations, our study provides important insights into fairness considerations 
about executive compensation and how they might relate to outrage costs.  
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Appendix A: Outrage potentiala for CEO compensation in the DAX30-firms 
Firm 
CEO compensation 
in 2012 in € Eligible voters 
Investment 
professionals 
Commerzbank 1,392,000 63% 13% 
Lufthansa 2,281,000 71% 23% 
K+S 2,618,000 72% 25% 
Infineon 2,900,000 72% 25% 
Continental 2,934,000 72% 25% 
Deutsche Börse 3,402,000 74% 31% 
Fresenius 3,494,000 74% 31% 
Beiersdorf 3,756,000 75% 32% 
RWE 3,803,000 75% 32% 
ThyssenKrupp 3,847,000 75% 32% 
Lanxess 4,122,000 76% 34% 
Deutsche Telekom 4,160,000 76% 34% 
Heidelberg Cement 4,349,000 76% 34% 
Munich RE 4,353,000 76% 34% 
Fresenius Medical Care 4,428,000 76% 34% 
Bayer 5,062,000 84% 61% 
BASF 5,286,000 84% 61% 
Deutsche Bank 5,306,000 84% 61% 
Deutsche Post 5,457,000 84% 61% 
Merck 5,549,000 84% 61% 
Allianz 5,797,000 84% 61% 
E.ON 5,961,000 84% 61% 
BMW 6,627,000 84% 63% 
Henkel 6,705,000 84% 63% 
Linde 6,920,000 84% 63% 
Adidas 7,286,000 85% 65% 
SAP 7,349,000 85% 65% 
Siemens 7,871,000 85% 65% 
Daimler 8,153,000 86% 66% 
Volkswagen 14,511,000 94% 90% 
 Lowest potential  63% 13% 
 Highest potential 94% 90% 
 Mean 79% 47% 
Notes: The table shows the outrage potential of eligible voters and investment professionals for the CEO 
compensation in the 30 largest exchange-listed German firms (DAX30) in 2012. These firms represent the 
reference group for participants’ stated amounts in our surveys. Compensation data was hand collected from the 
2012 compensation reports. Firms are ordered from lowest to highest CEO compensation. 
a Outrage potential: The percentage share of participants whose stated maximum acceptable amount lies below 
the respective firm’s actual CEO compensation in 2012 (i.e., the compensation amount that was reported in early 
2013). This measure captures outrage potential since exceeding the maximum acceptable amount may lead to 
disapproval strong enough to incite outrage. 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire – Telephone Survey among Eligible Voters23 
Questions – Executive Compensation 
The media often covers the compensation of top managers. This coverage usually refers to the 
CEO24 compensation of the 30 largest German firms whose shares are traded on the stock 
exchange. On average, every so-called DAX firm had a net income of €2.1 billion in 2012. 
Furthermore, it employed about 130,000 people. 
The compensation amounts that are referred to in the media usually reflect the total 
compensation that the CEO received within a year. These amounts include the fixed salary as 
well as variable bonus payments. Please refer to an average DAX firm for all following 
questions. 
 
COMP_FAIR 
Which total annual amount of compensation would you consider fair for the CEO of such a 
firm? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO  
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
COMP_UNFAIR 
Irrespective of the CEO’s performance, what do you think: Above which total amount would 
you no longer consider the compensation fair? Please state again a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
COMP_REQUEST 
Independent of your personal fairness preferences, what do you think: Which total amount of 
compensation would a particularly capable manager request at minimum for assuming the 
management of such a firm? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
                                                             
23 The questions presented in Appendix B are an excerpt from the original questionnaire that was used for the 
telephone survey among representative eligible voters. We translated all questions relevant to our study directly 
from German to be as close as possible to the original questions. 
24 In the German original, the term “Vorstandsvorsitzender” (chief executive officer) was used. To improve the 
readability of the English version of the survey, we use the abbreviation CEO in this translation. 
 
41 
 
VAR_SHARE 
The total annual amount of compensation of a CEO consists of a fixed salary and a bonus. 
The CEO always receives the fixed salary. The variable bonus varies with the firm’s 
performance. Now, please imagine the following situation: A firm finishes a fiscal year with 
average success, and all targets are achieved. In your opinion: What percentage should the 
bonus represent of the CEO’s total compensation? Please state a percentage between 0 and 
100 (for the bonus). 
 
0  ____________% 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
COMP_ACTUAL 
And what do you think: How large was the actual average total amount of compensation for 
the CEO of a DAX firm in the last year? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________ EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
NEWS 
Did you hear or read about any positive or less positive news about the overall economic 
situation within the last three months? 
 
0  Yes, positive 
0  Yes, negative 
0  Yes, both 
0  No, neither positive nor negative 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
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Questions – Personality traits 
 
 SIMILARITY 
I now have some questions about your personal attitudes and will read several statements to 
you. Please tell me how much you personally agree with the following statements by indicating: 
“fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “fully disagree”. 
 
 Fully 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Fully 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
N/A 
I like taking on 
responsibility. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
I like convincing others 
of my opinion. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
I often notice that others 
follow my actions. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
I can make my point. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I am often one step 
ahead of others. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 RISK_TOL 
How risk tolerant are you? Please assess your own risk tolerance on a scale from zero to ten. 
Zero means: “I am not risk tolerant at all”. Ten means: “I am very risk tolerant”. With the 
numbers in between (one, two, three, four five, six, seven, eight, nine), you can rank your risk 
tolerance. 
 
0 (Not risk 
tolerant at all) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Very 
risk tolerant) 
Don’t 
know 
N/A 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 OPTIMISM 
Please tell me how much you personally agree with the following statement by indicating: 
“fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “fully disagree”. 
 Fully 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Fully 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
N/A 
Usually, I expect that my 
personal affairs will turn 
out to be successful. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 COMPET 
Please tell me how much you personally agree with the following statements by indicating: 
“fully agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, “fully disagree”. 
 
 Fully 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Fully 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
N/A 
I like taking the lead in 
collective activities. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
I often give advice and 
make recommendations 
to others. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 TRUST 
Generally speaking, do you think that most other people can be trusted or that you cannot be 
cautious enough when dealing with other people?  
Please use a scale from zero to ten. Zero means “You cannot be cautious enough”. Ten means: 
“You can trust most other people”. With the numbers in between (one, two, three, four five, six, 
seven, eight, nine), you can rank your level of trust in others. 
 
0 (You cannot 
be cautious 
enough) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (You can 
trust most other 
people) 
Don’t 
know 
N/A 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Questions – Demographics 
 
GENDER 
 [Interviewer: Check box without asking] 
0  Male 
0  Female 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
AGE 
Please state the month and year of your birth.  
 
Month 
 
Year 
 
 
EDUCATION (composed of answers about school and college degree) 
Which is the highest school degree that you have?  
 
0 Elementary school/did not finish secondary school 
0 Finished secondary school without degree/did not receive a degree yet (still in school) 
0 Degree after 9 years of school 
0 Degree after 10 years of school 
0 High school degree after 12 years 
0 High school degree after 13 years, qualifying for university admission 
0 Other degree:  _________________________ 
 
0 Don’t know 
0 N/A 
 
Which is the highest college/university degree that you have?  
 
0 Intermediate examination 
0 Diploma, university of cooperative education 
0 Bachelor, university of applied science 
0 Diploma, university of applied science 
0 Bachelor, university 
0 Master, university of applied science 
0 Diploma/state examination, university 
0 Master, university 
0 PhD 
0 Other: _________________________ 
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0 Don’t know 
0 N/A 
 
INCOME (composed of stated amount and categories) 
What is the average monthly net income of your household? Be assured that your answer will 
not be linked to your name. 
The average monthly net income of your household is the total amount that consists of wages, 
self-employment income, and retirement benefits. Please also consider social welfare benefits, 
income from rented property, investment income, housing benefits, family benefits, and other 
income and deduct taxes and social security contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[If respondent is not sure about the exact amount] 
We don’t need to know the exact amount. This question should simply enable us to identify 
low-, medium- and high-income population groups. Therefore, we would like to learn what the 
average monthly net income of your household is. Be assured that your answer will not be 
linked to your name. I will now read out income groups to you. Please tell me in which group 
your household belongs. 
 
0  Below 500  EURO 
0  500 to 1,000 EURO 
0  1,000 to 1,500 EURO 
0  1,500 to 2,000 EURO 
0  2,000 to 3,000 EURO 
0  3,000 to 4,000 EURO 
0  4,000 to 5,000 EURO 
0  5,000 EURO and more 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire – Online Survey among Professional Investors25 
Introduction 
 
We would like to ask you for your participation in our study and for five minutes of your time. 
The study is about your personal attitude towards executive compensation in large German 
firms (DAX30). When we ask you about the total amount of compensation, we mean the sum 
of fixed salary, variable compensation, and the value of potential stock and option awards. For 
the following questions, please refer always to the CEO of an average DAX30-firm. 
(For your information: In 2012, a DAX30-firm had an average net income of €2.1 billion and 
employed about 130,000 people.) 
 
Questions – Executive Compensation 
 
COMP_FAIR 
Which total annual amount of compensation would you consider fair for the CEO of such a 
firm? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
COMP_UNFAIR 
Irrespective of the CEO’s performance, what do you think: Above which total amount can the 
compensation no longer be considered fair? Please state again a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 The questions presented in Appendix C are taken from the original questionnaire that was used for the online 
survey of investment professionals. Note that participants in the online survey received questions for the same 
compensation-related constructs as participants in the telephone survey. Minor adjustments were made in the 
introduction and the questions due to analysts’ deeper understanding of the topic and the fact that participants 
could read (and re-read) the questions on their own instead of listening to an interviewer. As this survey was also 
conducted in German, we translated all questions to be as close as possible to the original questions. 
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COMP_REQUEST 
Independent of your personal fairness preferences, what do you think: Which total amount of 
compensation would a particularly capable manager request at minimum for assuming the 
management of an average DAX30-firm? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
 
VAR_SHARE 
Please assume the following situation: The CEO and his or her firm achieve all targets by 
exactly 100% at the end of the fiscal year. What should the structure of the realized 
compensation look like, i.e., which percentage of the CEO’s compensation for this year 
should consist of variable components? Please state a percentage between 0 and 100. 
 
0  ____________% 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
 
FAIR_A, FAIR_B, PPS, RISK_PREM 
We would like to know how important the following criteria are for you when judging the total 
compensation amount of CEOs. 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements. 
 
It is important to me… 
Fully 
disagree    
Fully 
agree 
…that the absolute total amount of executive 
compensation is fair. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
…that the absolute total amount does not 
exceed a threshold that I no longer consider 
acceptable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
…that executive compensation is closely 
related to changes in the firm value. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
…that a higher executive compensation is only 
granted when the CEO carries more risk in 
return. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
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COMP_ACTUAL 
And what do you think: How large was the actual average total amount of compensation of a 
CEO in the last year? Please state a €-amount per year. 
 
0  _______________________ EURO 
 
0  Don’t know 
0  N/A 
 
 
Questions – Demographics 
 
COVERAGE 
In my job, I intensively deal with the DAX30-firms. 
Fully disagree  Fully agree  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
 
PROFESSION 
I am a...  
1 ¡ Financial analyst (sell-side) 5 ¡ Investment banker 
2 ¡ Financial analyst (buy-side) 6 ¡ Banker 
3 ¡ Fund manager 7 ¡ Investment consultant 
4 ¡ Asset manager 8 ¡ Other (please specify): 
         __________________ 
I am located in…  
1 ¡ Germany 
2 ¡ Other (please specify): 
_________________________ 
 
EXPERIENCE, AGE 
Please indicate… 
…your job experience. approx. _____________ years 
…your age.              _____________ years 
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Figure 1 
Estimates of executives’ actual compensation by representative eligible voters and 
investment professionals 
 
 
Note: a COMP_ACTUAL: Euro amount per year (in ’000) that participants estimate to be the actual 
compensation of the average DAX30-CEO in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
